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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-4491 
_____________ 
 
IN RE: DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 
 
 
                                                    Sydney Davis, 
                                                                             Appellant  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 99-cv-20593; MDL No. 2-16-md-1203) 
District Judges:  Hon. Harvey Bartle, III 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 19, 2013 
 
Before:   JORDAN, VANASKIE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 6, 2014) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Sydney Davis appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania denying her recovery under the terms of the Diet Drug Nationwide Class Action 
Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”).  We will affirm. 
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I.   Background 
This appeal relates to the settlement of multi-district products liability litigation 
regarding the diet drugs Pondimin and Redux, previously sold by American Home 
Products (“AHP”).  See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 543 F.3d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 
2008).  In November 1999, Wyeth, the successor-in-interest to AHP, joined plaintiffs’ 
representatives in the Settlement Agreement, which the District Court approved in 
August 2000.  See id. at 181.  Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Wyeth was 
required to contribute funds for the payment of claims.  See id. at 180.  The AHP 
Settlement Trust (the “Trust”), acting through its trustees and claims administrator, 
administers and reviews claims to determine the benefits, if any, that a class member is 
qualified to receive under the terms defined in the Settlement Agreement.  See id.
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Davis, a class member, sought compensation benefits under the Settlement 
Agreement.  She based her claim on an echocardiogram performed in 2002 after she had 
ingested Pondimin for six months.  Having reviewed the echocardiogram, her 
cardiologist, Dr. Mark Burton, diagnosed her with an ejection fraction of 60%.  Under the 
Settlement Agreement, that percentage is the upper limit of what is considered a reduced 
ejection fraction – meaning that the heart does not optimally pump blood with each beat – 
and is one of the qualifying medical conditions for compensation benefits under the 
                                              
1
 In our prior decisions, we have provided a detailed description of the Diet Drugs 
litigation.  See, e.g., In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 206-08 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Diet Drugs 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 147-48 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 385 F.3d 386, 389-92 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 
F.3d 220, 225-29 (3d Cir. 2002).  We will therefore limit our discussion to the essential 
facts of the instant appeal.  
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Settlement Agreement.
2
  On one of her application forms, her attesting physician, Dr. 
Gregory Boxberger, confirmed that she had a reduced ejection fraction in the range of 50 
to 60%.  Upon review, the Trust’s auditing cardiologist concluded that there was no 
“reasonable medical basis”3 for Dr. Boxberger’s finding that Davis suffered a reduced 
ejection fraction in that range and instead determined the ejection fraction to be 
“qualitatively more than 65%.”  (App. at A1636.)  Accordingly, the Trust denied Davis’s 
claim.     
Davis, disagreeing with that determination, submitted a Notice of Contest of Post 
Audit Determination, pursuant to Audit Rule 18 of the Settlement Agreement.  She 
attached a supplemental affidavit from Dr. Boxberger as well as affidavits from three 
additional cardiologists, all attesting that they had interpreted the echocardiogram and 
agreed with Dr. Boxberger’s finding that she had an ejection fraction of 50-60%.  After 
reviewing these additional materials and comparing them to the auditing cardiologist’s 
findings, the Trust reaffirmed its decision to deny Davis compensation benefits in a Final 
Post Audit Determination.   
                                              
2
 Davis was also diagnosed with “moderate mitral regurgitation” and “pulmonary 
hypertension secondary to moderate or greater mitral regurgitation”.  The District Court 
disagreed with the former diagnosis, which determination Davis did not appeal, but did 
not reach the latter as the Trust did not contest that diagnosis.  Therefore, the only 
medical issue on appeal is whether Davis suffered a reduced ejection fraction.  
 
3
 Under the Settlement Agreement Audit Rules, a “reasonable medical basis” is 
the standard that an auditing cardiologist applies in determining the validity of a medical 
diagnosis serving as the basis for a claim. (App. at A1582.) See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 543 F.3d at 183-84.  
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Davis formally disputed the Trust’s Final Post Audit Determination, and the Trust 
subsequently applied to the District Court to require Davis to show cause why her claim 
should be paid.  The District Court issued a show-cause order to Davis and referred 
Davis’s claim to a Special Master, who in turn appointed a Technical Advisor to review 
Davis’s claim.  The Technical Advisor issued a Technical Advisor Report, as required by 
the Settlement Agreement, on October 2, 2007.  In the report, the Technical Advisor 
agreed with the auditing cardiologist and concluded that there was no reasonable medical 
basis for Dr. Boxberger’s finding of a reduced ejection fraction.  The show-cause record, 
including that report and the parties’ statements of the case, was then submitted to the 
District Court.  After reviewing the record, the District Court determined that Davis had 
failed to meet her burden of proving that a reasonable medical basis existed to support 
her claim.  The District Court thus affirmed the Trust’s denial of her claim.  Davis timely 
appealed.  
II.   Discussion
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On appeal, Davis contends that the District Court erred in improperly relying on 
the opinion of the Technical Advisor to affirm the Trust’s denial of her claim5 and in 
                                              
4
 The District Court had original jurisdiction over all terms of the Settlement 
Agreement under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1407.  We exercise jurisdiction over a final 
order of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review a District Court’s 
exercise of its equitable authority to administer and implement a class action settlement 
for abuse of discretion.”  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 543 F.3d at 184 n.10.  An 
abuse of discretion may be found if the District Court’s decision “rest[s] on a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.”  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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determining that she had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating a reasonable medical 
basis for the attesting physician’s finding of a reduced ejection fraction.  We disagree 
with both of those contentions.   
The Settlement Agreement Audit Rules permit a Special Master to assign a 
Technical Advisor to review the record and to prepare a report to the District Court 
“setting forth his/her opinions regarding the issue(s) in dispute in the audit.”  (App. at 
1524.)  The Technical Advisor also “act[s] as a sounding board for the judge – helping 
the jurist to educate himself in the jargon and theory disclosed by the testimony and to 
think through the critical technical problems.”  Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 158 
(1st Cir. 1988).  A review of the District Court’s Memorandum Opinion and the show-
cause record demonstrates that the Court carefully considered the entire record, not just 
what the Technical Advisor said.  Nothing here indicates a simple “rubber stamping” of 
the Technical Advisor’s opinion.6  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12; App. at A3-A13.)   
                                                                                                                                                  
5
 The Trust contends that Davis waived this argument by not challenging the 
procedure for appointing a technical advisor and obtaining and relying on a technical 
advisor’s opinion at the formation of the Settlement Agreement.  Davis did not waive this 
argument, however, as she challenges the District Court’s application of the procedures 
set forth in the Settlement Agreement Audit Rules and not the procedures themselves.   
 
6
 Davis argues that the District Court “merely rubber stamped the Technical 
Advisor’s finding that there was no ‘reasonable medical basis’” for her diagnosis.  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12.)  The “evidence” that Davis proffers in support of her 
contention is the fact that the District Court has previously adopted a technical advisor’s 
findings concerning claims arising under the Settlement Agreement 169 out of 170 times.  
That lone contention highlights the problem in her argument – she cannot point to 
anything in the record suggesting that the Court improperly relied on the Technical 
Advisor in this case.   
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The District Court’s determination was also not clearly erroneous.  “The test is not 
what this court would have done under the same circumstances; that is not enough.  The 
Court must feel that only one order could have been entered on the facts.”  In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting In re Gypsum Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 
1977)).  Davis fails to show that the only conclusion that could be drawn from her 
echocardiogram is that she suffered from a reduced ejection fraction.  As the District 
Court noted, she failed to rebut the opinions of the auditing cardiologist and the 
Technical Advisor that she did not have a reduced ejection fraction.  She merely stood on 
her own cardiologists’ affirmations, which only disagree with those findings.  But 
disagreement, without more, does not foreclose contrary conclusions.  Because Davis 
cannot demonstrate that the District Court’s determination was clearly erroneous, her 
argument that she met her burden to show a reasonable medical basis for her condition 
must fail.
7
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 Davis proffers two additional arguments to undermine the conclusions of the 
auditing cardiologist and the Technical Advisor, neither of which are persuasive.  First, 
she contends that “inter-reader variability” expands the range of measurements required 
to qualify for matrix benefits, although she makes that argument only in a passing 
reference in her opening brief and fails to develop it.  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 19.)  
The District Court rightly concluded that, if the argument were accepted, it “would allow 
a claimant to recover Matrix benefits with an ejection fraction as high as 79%.  This 
result would render meaningless this critical provision of the Settlement Agreement.”  
(App. at A12.)  Second, she argues that the Technical Advisor failed to utilize any one of 
three “generally accepted” methods of calculating ejection fractions.  But she points to no 
support for her argument that one method should be preferred over another – indeed, she 
concedes that the Settlement Agreement does not recommend or prefer a specific method 
in determining ejection fractions.  Furthermore, she proffers no evidence that “a different 
result would obtain had [her preferred method] been used.”  (App. at A11.)  
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III.   Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
